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hispaper illustrates the development
of a five-year promotion plan and 10-
year forecast for the unrestricted
Marine Corps Reserve (MCR) colonel (O6)
population using Markov chains and goal
programming. A Markov chain model is
used to represent the O5 and O6 MCR pop-
ulation. A goal program allows the speci-
fication of grade strength targets set by
statutory limitations for the rankofO6.Using
a linear program with promotion opportu-
nityand in-zone time-in-grade (TIG) rangeas
decision variables for a five-year planning
horizon, the goals of the model are to meet
grade strength targets and produce consis-
tent promotion opportunity and in-zone
values across the planning horizon. The
entire unrestricted Reserve officer popula-
tion is then modeled for an additional five
years to monitor company and field grade
officer strengths upon returning to the run-
ning mate system.
INTRODUCTION
The military drawdown of the 1990s
resulted in an increased number of company
and field grade officers transferring from the
Active to Reserve component. This, com-
bined with implementation of the Reserve
Officer Personnel Management Act and
greater than anticipated Post-9/11 retention,
exacerbated a growing population of senior
Marine Corps Reserve (MCR) officers. As
a result, in July 2004 the MCR colonels in
an active statusa exceeded the statutory lim-
itation of 490 and reached a peak of 660 in
June 2008 as depicted in Figure 1.
Statutory limitations are congressionally
mandated ceilings on controlled grades at
the end of the fiscal year (September 30).
During a time of war or declared national
emergency, the President of theUnited States
may temporarily suspend these limits for
a period of up to two years.b The current
waiver of this authority expired in February
of 2010c and as of November 2011, an ap-
proval of an additional two-year waiver was
not anticipated.
To reduce the MCR colonel popula-
tion to meet the statutory limits, Head-
quarters Marine Corps, Manpower, and
Reserve Affairs in 2008 initiated the follow-
ing actions:
• Elicit voluntary retirements
• Reduce promotion opportunity
• Hold a Selective Retention Board (SRB)
• Reduce promotion zones (size of group to
be considered for promotion) by decou-
pling from the running mate system
Voluntary retirements occur when an
MCR colonel agrees to retire early from
the Reserve component. However, because
Congress had not authorized monetary in-
centives, this course of action did not nearly
account for the necessary reduction in grade
strength. Thus, in the precept for the Fis-
cal Year 2010 (FY10) and FY11 promotion
boards, promotion opportunity was reduced
by Headquarters Marine Corps from 52% to
42%.d (Note: this opportunity was chosen to
remain consistentwith Secretary of theNavy
(SECNAV) guidance regarding opportunity
and to avoid unfairly penalizing future in-
zone populations.) Additionally, on October
14, 2008, 99 retirement-eligible colonels were
selected by the SRB for involuntary retire-
ment, or separation.e Lastly, the running
mate system is a policy used for Reserve Na-
val officer promotions for the grades below
flag officer rank in which Reserve officers
are assigned running mates from the active
duty list.When the Reserve officer’s running
mate is in-zone for promotion, the Reserve
officer is also in-zone for promotion.f The
Marine Corps abandoned this system for
the FY11 unrestricted Reserve colonel pro-
motion board in order to meet statutory
limitations by 30 September 2010. These
combined actions were necessary to meet
the statutory limits; however, none of these
measures involved a feasible long-term so-
lution or identified consistent promotion
opportunities and zones for the Marine
Corps Total Force.g The Secretary of the
Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 1420.1B
states ‘‘promotion zones will be designed
to provide relatively similar promotion op-
portunity over a period of five years.’’ Pro-
motion zone is defined as the time frame
for which officers are considered for promo-
tion. The current zone is based off of the pre-
vious zone that was selected for promotion.
Generally, colonels are in-zone sometime be-
tween five and seven years after promotion
to lieutenant colonel. The promotion oppor-
tunity is defined as the percentage of people
in-zone who can be chosen for promotion.
The promotion opportunity is calculated by
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divided by the number of officers in the primary
zone for promotion. Note: officers in the primary
zone are senior to officers below zone for promo-
tion and have not previously been passed over
(also known as failing selection) for promotion
to that grade.
This paper addresses both short-term and
long-term planning for the Marine Corps Total
Force with two main objectives. The first objec-
tive was to verify that the before mentioned ac-
tions would return the MCR colonel population
to statutory limitations by September 30, 2010.
The second objectivewas to identify annual pro-
motion opportunities and zones that would
maintain the MCR colonel population within
statutory limits through 2015 (while returning
to the running mate system) and then monitor-
ing this population for an additional five years.
Mathematical modeling of the MCR population
provided a method for accomplishing these
goals. We used goal programming optimization
to minimize deviation from target strength num-
bers for a five-year planning horizon, where end
strength was modeled through a Markov chain,
by controlling the in-zone ranges and promotion
opportunities.
MOTIVATION
The President of the United States may au-
thorize a waiver that allows growth of controlled
officer grades beyond the statutory limits during
a time of war or declared national emergency
to meet planned mobilization requirements.
Exceeding the statutory limits in the MCR is
not generally considered a fiduciary issue since
only those officers on active duty or serving in
a formal SelectedMarine Corps Reserve (SMCR)
(drilling) billet receive substantial monetary al-
lowances. However, one often overlooked con-
cern of promoting beyond statutory limitations
is the incurrence of other manpower costs. Al-
though excess pay and benefits are fiscally con-
strained by annual appropriations and marginal
administrative costs are inconsequential, it
would be a mistake to ignore increased future
retirement obligations.
Contributions to the retired pay accrual ac-
count (RPA) fund Reserve retirements and are
based on actuary tables and the base pay and
compensation of the SMCR.h Increasing grade
strength while maintaining constant SMCR
paychecks results in cumulative actuarial losses
to the fund and recoupment through future in-
creases to the Reserve RPA rate and amortization
schedule. In this section we sought to discover
an approximate hidden future cost to the DoD
based on exceeding statutory limits. We calcu-
lated the marginal cost of retirement per person
as well as the current estimated cumulative mar-
ginal retirement cost and net present value of
that total.
Unlike active duty retirees who immedi-
ately receive annuity payments, Reserve retirees
are not eligible to receive retirement annuity
payments until age 60. However, only 20 years
of Reserve qualifying service is required in-
stead of mandating 20 complete years of active
duty service.i A qualifying year includes any
Figure 1. Graphical depiction of MCR colonel historical trends.
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combination of active duty, inactive duty (drills),
membership, funeral honors duty, and equiva-
lent instruction in which one accumulates 50
retirement points. Generally, a member re-
ceives 1 point for each day of active duty, 1
point per drill, 1 point for each period of
equivalent duty (paid or unpaid), 1 point for
completion of funeral honors duty, and 15
membership points per year. For a full discus-
sion of Reserve retirement credits and qualifi-
cations see Chapter 9 of Marine Corps Order
1001R.1K. Recently, the FY08 National De-
fense Authorization Act reduced the retire-
ment age by three months for every 90
consecutive days on active duty operational
support orders after January 28, 2008.j Not-
withstanding this amendment,we assumeda re-
tirement age of 60 years for cost calculations.
We calculated retirement annuities at a rate
of 2½ percent of the active duty base pay of the
highest rank satisfactorily heldk for each cu-
mulative period consisting of 360 retirement
points.l Retirement in-grade for officers above
the rank of major requires three satisfactory






The active duty annual pay is based on the
pay tables when retired pay is calculated (age
60) and subject to annual cost of living adjust-
ments. We rounded down fractional years
resulting from the 360 point calculations to
the lower 30 day (month) period. For instance,
36,100 points would be rounded down to
36,090 points (equivalent to 10.25 years and
an annuity of 25.625%).
Calculating Marginal Costs
of Retirement
The marginal cost of exceeding statutory
limitations for grade strength is calculated by
taking the difference between annuity payments
of the higher retired grade (plus additional retire-
ment points earned by MCR colonels compared
to lieutenant colonels) and then multiplying that
annual amount by the cumulative overage of




To perform these calculations, wemade cer-
tain assumptions regarding the characteristics
and behavior of MCR colonels and lieutenant
colonels.
The average career retirement points accu-
mulated by colonels and lieutenant colonels are
independent of grade strength overages from
October 1, 2001 (post 9/11)–April 30, 2009 (prior
to SRB retirements)
• The percentage of colonels obtaining the mini-
mum satisfactory service required for retire-
ment in-grade is independent of grade
strength overages during this same timeperiod
• The average life expectancy of MCR colonels
and lieutenant colonels is consistent with the
data published by the US Department of
Health and Human Services (United States
Life Tables, 2004)
Using data obtained from the Total Force
Data Warehouse (TFDW),m we calculated the
average career retirement points credited for
colonels and lieutenant colonels at retirement,
the percentage of colonels meeting the service
requirements for retirement in-grade, the aver-
age age at promotion to colonel, and the average
cohort survival rates. The average career retire-
ment credit points for lieutenant colonels are
based on those officers passed over for promo-
tion to colonel.
Table 1 incorporates retirement annuities
based on 2009 Military Pay Tables published by
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service,
an average life expectancy of 79.31 years, which
accounts for gender differences in the subject
population, and the fiscal year promotionswhich
exceeded statutory limitations accounting for co-
hort survival.
The average lifetime marginal cost per per-
son in excess of the statutory limit was approx-
imately $200,000. In addition to retirement cost
calculations per person, Table 1 also accounts
for the overall retirement marginal cost by SRB-
induced savings due to the involuntary early
retirement of 99 colonels during FY 2009 and
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accounts for the average career retirement point
reduction for separated officers due to a short-
ened career. This is a conservative estimate
and likely over-estimates any cost savings due
to the SRB. It is important to note that the SRB
resulted in relatively minor savings (less than
$3 million dollars), reinforcing the principle
that policy makers should address long-term
health of manpower populations in advance
through consistent planning vice more drastic,
after-the-fact measures.
Net Present Value
The cumulative retirement cost of more than
33.5 million dollars will be paid out over a num-
ber of future years, beginning in less than nine
years for the earliest recipients. Using a net
present value calculation, we can determine
the real cost to the government in 2009. How-
ever, the retirement annuities are not constant.
The base pay calculation will increase annually
according to congressionally-mandated military
pay raises until age 60 based on the Employment
Cost Index (ECI).n Additionally, monthly annu-
ities will continue to increase according to con-
gressionally mandated cost of living adjustments
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Introducing the government’s current 30-
year discount rate of 4.9%,p an annual ECI of
3.37%q until age 60, and a 3.1% COLA rater there-
after, resulted in a cost to the government of more
than 25.3 million dollars. Although exceeding the
statutory limits doesn’t have any immediate con-
sequences to budget considerations, this illus-
trates the costs incurred at a later date through
amortized RPA rate increases. Reducing the
MCR colonel population to within the statutory
limits will eliminate additional hidden future
costs. This paper seeks to optimize zone range
and promotion opportunity based on meeting
specific grade strength targets.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Mathematical models are suitable for ana-
lyzing manpower planning decisions and have
been effectively utilized in the manpower mili-
tary community. Typically, military manpower
model applications found in the literature are
designed for a specific force (e.g., Army) and
focus on either the enlisted or officer Corps, al-
though there is some work found that includes
evaluation of the entire force structure (see
Workman 2009). A common theme found in
the analysis of military manpower is to study
strength as a function of time (for a fixed plan-
ning horizon) and select decision variables that
can be influenced through changes in policy.
Examples of decision variables include acces-
sions per year, promotion rates, branch details,
inventory, advancement, recruiting, and reten-
tion. This research used a Markov chain to pre-
dict the number of MCR colonels in an active
status and an optimization model to control
variables in order to achieve target strengths.
Several examples of optimization models
used for evaluatingmilitary manpower require-
ments and/or personnel policy decisions are
found in the literature. Charnes et al. (1975)























FY Cohort Total Cost
LtCol Base 4700.93 32.50% $ 2,576.83
93.40% $ 852.37 $197,511
04 22 $ 4,345,237.72
$33,566,188
05 71 $ 14,086,503.51
Col
No SRB 5084.17 35.21% $ 3,489.43
06 22 $ 4,299,757.34
07 46 $ 9,125,948.09
08 23 $ 4,550,697.62
SRB -190 -1.25% $ (123.89) 100% $(123.89) $(28,707) SRB 99 $ (2,841,956.59)
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provide a review of manpower and personnel
model (both military and civilian) research from
1967–1975. This review includes a discussion
about analytical techniques used to model man-
power systems and provides reference to several
earlier works on manpower modeling for the
Navy and Air Force.
Two of the authors on the review paper by
Charnes et al. (Charnes and Cooper) joinedwith
Bres and Burns to publish a paper on the use of
goal programming in conjunction with Markov
chains for planning officer accessions to the US
Navy from a variety of commission sources (Bres
et al. 1980). Mehlmann (1980) uses dynamic pro-
gramming in conjunction with Markov chains in
order to optimize recruitment and grade transi-
tions strategies. Holz andWroth (1980) use a goal
programming model that determines the gains
(accessions) that maintain the Army’s operating
force strength as closely as possible over a finite
planning horizon. Zanakis and Maret (1981)
combine a Markov chain with a goal program-
ming optimization to assess the manning of an
engineering plant in flux. They do not apply
the work in their paper to a military setting,
but reference applied military works of similar
flavor. Collins et al. (1983) use a goal program-
ming approach to optimize the mix of incoming
enlisted recruits (within each of the military ser-
vices) by specific personnel characteristics. Gass
et al. (1988) present a Markov chain model of
the US Army and an optimization model (goal
programming linear model) to meet target end
strength over a long-range planning period
(7–20 years).
Thomas et al. (1997) describe their systems
dynamics and network approach to modeling
the US Army’s enlisted personnel. Their net-
work contains subsets of smaller models includ-
ing several linear programs. Schrews (2002)
presents a linear program that studies the Ac-
tive Guard Reserve enlisted manpower policies
directly influencing critical career fields. Gibson
(2007) uses a linear program to determine the
number of annual accessions and zone promo-
tion rates for officers in the Army Competitive
Category (a subset of the Army officer Corps)
over a 40-year horizon.
Although the concept ofMarkov chain anal-
ysis and goal programming is not a new topic
or application, this paper contributes to the
literature and body of work in mathematical
application in the military by providing: (1)
an application of optimization for the Marine
Corps Unrestricted Reserve manpower, (2) the
simultaneous optimization of promotion zone
range andpromotion opportunity, and (3) the de-
velopment of an Excel-based tool that can be
used for future planning by informing policy
decision makers. To the authors’ knowledge,
there were no optimization applications for
planning target strengths in the MCR commu-
nity, nor were there efforts to develop a long-
term plan for meeting the statutory limits of
the Marine Corps Unrestricted Reserve colo-
nels. Edwards (1983), who provides a broad
sampling of mathematical manpower planning
models, states: ‘‘a common theme of successful
application is that a good presentation of results
and ease of use are more important to uses than
theoretical sophistication.’’ The model devel-
oped in this paper was based on an easy-to-use
format within an Excel spreadsheet and pro-
vided to the M&RA Reserve Plans Section Head
and Officer Promotion Planner for implementa-
tion. M&RA has incorporated this model in its
planning process and is currently pursuing addi-
tional models to capture the Reserve enlisted and
restricted officer populations. As a result, the
FY12 unrestricted Reserve officer promotion plan
was developed and approved by the Secretary of
the Navy for implementation using this model.
MODEL FORMULATION
The goals of the research described in the
introduction section were met through the
modeling and analysis of the lieutenant colo-
nel and colonel ranks in the MCR. This was
done through a goal programming formula-
tion with an embedded Markov chain. Next, we
describe the flow of officers and data collection.
We then present the Markov chain that we
use to calculate the number of colonels by year
and the goal programming optimizationmodel
and formulation.
Officer Flow and Data Collection
The flow in and out of senior company and
field grade ranks (captain, major, lieutenant
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colonel, and colonel) in the Marine Corps is
shown in Figure 2. In this representation, pro-
motion to General Officer is not specifically
depicted, but can be counted as a portion of
the exits. The dotted box in Figure 2 represents
the segment of the population that was mod-
eled. Modeling the officers at the O6 grade (col-
onel) through a Markov chain required the
definition of four types of transitions. They are:
remain in-grade, promote from lieutenant colo-
nel to colonel, laterally transition from an inac-
tive status to an active status, and laterally
transition from an active status to an inactive sta-
tus or exit the rank of colonel (either by promo-
tion to general, natural attrition, retirement, or
by involuntary action).
Markov chains specifically require the def-
inition of nodes, the transition matrix, and the
total number of entities within each node for
an initial time period. Manpower models for-
mulated via a Markov chain representation re-
quire taking inventory of the personnel in each
class at equally spaced points in time. This
type of data allows the definition of the nodes,
the empirical calculation of elements in the
transition matrix, and the total number of per-
sonnel in each node. For this paper, MCR offi-
cers by month from September 2001 to July
2009 were obtained from TFDWm on August 13,
2009.
The data collected included a unique iden-
tifier, officer rank, data of rank, and training
category pay group by month. Additionally,
planned and actual promotion opportunities
for officers (above-, below-, and in-zone), 2004–
2010 fiscal year promotion statistics, planned
2011 fiscal year promotion zones and opportu-
nities, and the 2009 fiscal year SRB results
summary from Headquarters Marine Corps,
Manpower & Reserve Affairs were collected.
The 2010 fiscal year colonel promotion board
results and the planned schedule for effecting
those promotions were also collected. Table 2
summarizes the strength, average time in-grade,
and promotion zone opportunities for lieutenant
colonels and colonels.
Markov Chain Model
The data collected in the previous section
were used to generate a Markov chain that de-
scribes the number of MCR colonels as a func-
tion of time (in years). In manpower examples,
this type of model is often called a cross-
sectional model because the number of personnel
in the organization is illustrated at discrete (and
equal) time intervals thus providing a snapshot
(or cross-section) of the organization. For the
purposes of this study, we added a longitudinal
aspect to the model in order to properly account
for zone calculations. Instead of modeling the
number of colonels as a single node, we ex-
panded the nodes in the model to include time-
in-grade (TIG) by month because zone ranges
are defined in terms of months. Figure 3 illus-
trates an example of the O6 officer class ex-
panded to include TIG.
We used the data collected during the years
2001–2009 to create the transitionmatrix and de-
fine the number of officers in each node in 2009.
We determined strength, lateral growth, and at-
trition by TIG (in months) empirically using the
data. Note that these data account for all cate-
gories of losses as part of the continuation rates
from year to year. Lateral movement into the O5
and O6 populations was modeled as constant
growth based on historical trends. Additional
assumptions made include:
• Monthly growth and attrition by TIG is con-
stant based on historical averages (Oct 2001–
April 2009).
• The Active Reserve (AR) colonel population
will be managed sufficiently as to not nega-
tively impact Reserve colonel grade strength
limits.s The AR colonel population is a subset
of the entire Reserve population and man-
aged as a separate competitive category.
• Marines are promoted throughout the
year equally (monthly promotions ¼ total
selected / 12). Marines separated due to
the 2009 fiscal year SRB are equally distrib-
uted across the eligible population.
• All promotions are effected from June 1st to
May 1st of the fiscal year following the year
of the promotion board.t
Using the data to populate the number in
each node (O5 and O6 by TIG), the following
equation describes the number in each class by
year t:
xiðt1 1Þ5P#xiðtÞ1 ril (5)
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where, xi is a column vector of grade strength by
TIG (i varies from 0 to 108), t is timemeasured in
months, P is the transition matrix, ri represents
four distinct column vectors incorporating lat-
eral transfer and promotion proportions, and l
represents the monthly promotions and lateral
transfers.
We made two additional assumptions to
simplify the model, but we do not expect them
to negatively impact the long-term results. There
are 99 Marines who were not selected for reten-
tion on the FY09 Selective Retention Board and
thus were separated beginning in April 2009.
However, a small percentage of separations oc-
curred as late as FY11 resulting in slightly inaccu-
rate FY09 grade strength predictions. Also, all
selections to O6 are made from the in-zone pop-
ulation. Although it is possible to be selected
Table 2. Summary of descriptive statistics.
Rank Observations Date Strength Average time in-grade
O6 50,629
September 2001 352 39.7
April 2009 641 39.6
O5 143,547
September 2001 1514 35.0
April 2009 1325 48.8
Figure 2. Marine Corps officers.
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fromabove- or below-zone, this is not considered
in this paper.
Goal Programming Model
Goal programming is used for multicrite-
ria problems that have target levels to achieve
rather than values to maximize or minimize
(Rardin 1998). Manpower problems focused
on target strength for a particular planning
horizon are well-suited for formulation as a
goal-programming problem. The targets of fo-
cus in this paper are the number of colonels in
the MCR community for the end of fiscal years
2010–2014. The goals in priority order (highest
to lowest) are:
• Meet the statutory limits for number of colo-
nels at the end of fiscal years 2011–2014
• Create zone ranges that are consistent for fis-
cal years 2012–2015
• Create promotion opportunities that are con-
sistent from 2012–2015
In addition to these goals, the Marine Corps
plans to return to the running mate system by
FY15. To account for this, we placed a hard con-
straint on the number of months to which the
zones can sum in the years 2011–2015. Figure 4
shows the goal programming formulation based
on these goals.
RESULTS
We validated our model through histori-
cal data checks and determined the plausibil-
ity of optimal results. The optimal solutions
Figure 3. Flow of MCR colonels.
Figure 4. Goal programming formulation.
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conformed to expected behaviors given that
the optimal zones and opportunitieswerewithin
the range of expected values for the assumed
transition matrix. Table 3 illustrates the optimal
promotion solution (plan) assuming that the esti-
mates of our transition matrix are valid. While
the transitionmatrix elements are valid for histor-
ical data, these elements will vary in time.
The optimal solution, Table 3, met the high-
est priority goal of grade strengthwhilemeeting
all model constraints to include returning to the
running mate system. In the model, we placed
weights on the goals in terms of their respective
priorities. As a result of the highest priority
given to achievement of statutory limits, the op-
timized results failed to achieve consistent
zones ranges and consistent promotion oppor-
tunities across the planning horizon.
Because of the mismatch between promo-
tion and fiscal years, there is some flexibility to
exceed end strength during any given promo-
tion year (May–June) and then adjust to the stat-
utory limitation prior to the end of the fiscal year
on September 30. We tested separate weighting
schemes that prioritized consistent zone and
opportunity resulting in a slight grade strength
shortage. Overall, this analysis indicates that
the maximum grade strength of 490 is achiev-
able by allowing for relatively minor variance
in promotion opportunities.
We conducted a sensitivity analysis to study
the changes in thedecisionvariables as a function
of changes in the assumed transition matrix. The
values for these optimized zones and promotion
opportunities are in Table 4. Attrition rate was
the focus of the sensitivity analysis. In the analy-
sis, we varied attrition by 20% around the nomi-
nal value and then reran optimization.
In addition, in the sensitivity analysis we
considered reprioritizing the goal programming.
In the ES1:1 model shown in Table 4, we reduced
the grade strength requirement to the lowest pri-
ority, and penalized deficiencies and overages
equally. In the ES10:1model, we gave implemen-
tation of a promotion plan thatwouldmeet or ex-
ceed statutory limitations the highest priority
and weighted deficiencies using a factor of 10
compared to grade strength underages.
In both attrition rate cases, we achieved the
overall objective of the promotion plan (to meet
grade strength) as shown in FY14; however, a
significant change to the FY12 zone (ninemonths)
was necessary for the decreased attrition model
(220% attrition). Additionally, overall opportuni-
ties rose significantly (average of 4.5% percentage
points from the optimum solution in Table 3) for
the increased attrition model (120% attrition).
An interesting result of the decreased attrition
model was that grade strength was slightly ex-
ceeded for FY11 (492). Because this small of
a delta is easily fixed in monthly promotions,
the projected grade strength overage is not a big
issue. However, if a promotion plan with pro-
jected grade strength of 490 became a require-
ment for FY12, not allowing for any deviation
from the target (no slack), then there would be
a need to decrease the opportunity to 40% at nine
months,which is theminimumallowed according
to SecNav guidance for promotion opportunity.
Reprioritizing the goal programming alsopro-
vided interesting results. Specifically, loosening
the grade strength overage penalty provided
a more consistent promotion plan and we rec-
ommended M&RA adopt this model over their
original requirements given the ability to fix
small overages in execution.
Long-Term Projections
and Steady-State Analysis
To assess the long-term consequences of
returning to the running mate system, we
Table 3. Optimal promotion plan.
Board Zone size (months) Opportunity Selects Grade strength as of September 30
FY11 4 40% 41 485
FY12 16 53% 104 483
FY13 13 52% 77 489
FY14 14 51% 97 490
FY15 15 52% 47 -
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expanded the five-year model to 10 years, incor-
porating each of the unrestricted Reserve officer
grades depicted in Figure 2. Three intercon-
nected Markov chains consisting of colonels
and lieutenant colonels, lieutenant colonels
and majors, and majors and captains were cho-
sen to maintain flexibility and computational
ease over a single comprehensive model which
would have required 532 nodes.
Additionally, the third model, which in-
cluded the captain feeder population, enabled
the evaluation of recent changes to company
grade officer programs such as the reinstitu-
tion of active component career designation
and the implementation of the Officer Candi-
date Course-Reserve (OCC-R) commissioning
program in 2007. The M&RA officer accession
planner provided estimated Reserve officer
transitions due to career designation and the
Reserve Affairs officer program officer pro-
vided the OCC-R accessions.
Table 5,monitoring of colonel grade strength
from FY15–19 illustrates the successful return of
the colonel population to the running mate sys-
tem with regard to statutory limitations holding
future zone size stable at 12 months with steady
promotion opportunity of 52%. However, the
FY19 grade strength of 446 also generates some
concern as to the sustainability of Reserve col-
onel grade strength at statutory limitations
without a future increase in promotion oppor-
tunity. We recommended M&RA review officer
mobilization requirements and participation
rates to determine minimum on-hand manning
levels. Upon M&RA’s request, Luther (2011) de-
veloped a predictive model for participation
rates based on grade strength and completed
a review of officer mobilization requirements.
As a result of this follow-on analysis, M&RA
planners have modified the five-year plan us-
ing the Excel tool we provided to implement
a ‘‘controlled’’ reduction in Reserve colonel
grade strength below statutory limitations (in
consonance with officer mobilization require-
ments) mindful of future RPA savings to DoD.
Modeling the entire Reserve officer popula-
tion is also helpful in providing insight into
the long-term impacts of recent policy and
Table 4. Promotion opportunity and zone range optimal values for various cases.
Weights Baseline Linear ES 1:1 ES 10:1 120% attrition 220% attrition
Opportunity
FY12 53% 53% 52% 55% 57% 48%
FY13 52% 52% 51% 51% 56% 49%
FY14 51% 51% 51% 51% 56% 49%
FY15 52% 52% 52% 52% 57% 49%
Zones
FY12 16 16 16 16 16 9
FY13 13 13 14 13 15 17
FY14 14 14 14 14 14 16
FY15 15 15 14 15 13 16
Grade strength
FY10 503 503 503 503 490 516
FY11 485 485 486 488 468 492
FY12 483 483 487 490 476 472
FY13 489 489 490 491 490 490
FY14 490 490 489 492 487 489
Objective 14.70 13.70 12.42 37.79 45.76 82.01
Table 5. Five-year monitoring.
Board Zone Opportunity Selects Grade strength as of September 30
FY15 12 52% 47 470
FY16 12 52% 79 472
FY17 12 52% 70 477
FY18 12 52% 64 471
FY19 12 52% 53 446
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programmatic changes. For instance, the officer
grade strengths depicted in Table 6 illustrate an
84.4% increase of captains and 38.2% majors
during the next 10 years. Left unchecked, these
trends could result in future Reserve colonel
grade strength overages and the reoccurrence
of an SRB.
Thus, we used steady state analysis, ‘‘forc-
ing’’ uniform promotion selects across each of
the three models, allowing for the approxima-
tion of grade strengths over the next 26 years.
As such, the estimated steady state impact of
OCC-R accessions and active component career
designation is a grade strength of 3,288 captains
(FY20), 2,644 majors (FY 32), 1,611 lieutenant
colonels (FY36), and 700 colonels (FY38). As sus-
pected, the colonel population will not remain
within statutory limitations by a simple reduc-
tion of promotion opportunity to the minimum
level of 40% beginning in FY30. As such, we rec-
ommended that the Marine Corps consider also
reducing the lieutenant colonel promotion op-
portunity to 65% beginning in FY24 as one of
several potential courses of action. As a result
of this analysis and the beforementioned study
by Luther, M&RA planners will begin address-
ing reducing lieutenant colonel promotion op-
portunity as early as the FY14 promotion plan.
CONCLUSION
The promotion plan proposed in the results
section provides a baseline model to maintain
unrestricted Reserve colonel grade strength
within statutory limits for the proceeding five
years taking into account historical lateral move-
ments and attrition data. Based on the analysis,
we demonstrated that the proposed promotion
plan will allow the Marine Corps to return to
the running mate system within five years.
Sensitivity analysis indicates the model is
flexible and fairly robust to variations in attri-
tion. Using average attrition rates based on em-
pirical data from 2001–2009 and not accounting
for behavioral changes due to the SRB, the results
of the paper confirmed that the Marine Corps
would be within FY10 grade strength limitations
on September 30, 2010. Variation of attrition be-
havior among the retained SRB population could
have resulted in FY10 grade strength exceeding
limitations unless FY10 and some FY09 promo-
tions were withheld until October 1, 2010.
The 10-year model provides a mechanism
by which to monitor long-term unrestricted
Reserve officer grade strengths. Using steady
state analysis, potential issues can be identi-
fied and manpower populations maintained
using common grade shaping actions before
more severe manpower corrections are neces-
sary, such as the SRB implemented during FY09
by the Marine Corps.
The recommendations resulting from this
analysis, accepted and adopted by M&RA, were
to
• Implement a promotion plan such as the
baseline presented in Table 4
• Validate attrition, grade strengths, and lateral
movements annually and rerun the model in
Table 6. Ten-year projections.
Grade Colonel LtCol Maj Capt
Board Selects Strength Selects Strength Selects Strength Selects Strength
FY10 - 503 - 1,309 - 1,539 - 1,776
FY11 41 485 162 1,287 334 1,598 60 1,877
FY12 104 483 157 1,211 385 1,655 60 1,999
FY13 77 489 114 1,125 269 1,674 98 2,270
FY14 97 490 135 1,074 309 1,705 98 2,518
FY15 47 470 108 1,059 257 1,715 98 2,826
FY16 79 472 164 1,055 241 1,721 98 3,057
FY17 70 477 192 1,069 427 1,827 98 3,190
FY18 64 471 177 1,069 449 1,978 98 3,245
FY19 53 446 161 1,100 470 2,127 98 3,275
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order to detect changes and differences. This
will allow fine-tune corrections as necessary
to staywithin grade strength limitations given
any changes in population behavior and/or
dynamics or changes in government policy
• Determine the minimum unrestricted Re-
serve officer inventory necessary tomeetmo-
bilization requirements and appropriately
modify the promotion plan in FY15–19 to en-
sure on-handmanning is sufficient across the
Ready Reserve
• Continue to monitor 26-year officer popula-
tion forecasts, detecting and applying ap-
propriate policy and planning guidance well
in-advance of potential issues
• Change the priorities of the optimization to
determine the impact on optimal promotion
zones and opportunities
This paper presents a framework for study-
ing optimal zone and promotion opportunity
policy in order to achieve goals such as target
grade strength and consistent zone ranges and
opportunity rates. A relaxation of modeling as-
sumptions could add additional insights. This
paper illustrates how a specific implementation
for modeling the MCR colonels in the Marine
Corps can influence or informmanpower policy
decisions. Improvements to the model would in-
clude creating amodel for the active officerCorps,
and linking the MCR model with the active duty
model in order to effectively study returning to
the running mate system. Additionally, incorpo-
rating a forecasting approach to model officer
continuation could prove beneficial and act as
an additional layer for the sensitivity analysis.
NOTES
a National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1995, Public Law 103-337, § 1662,
US Statutes at Large 108 (1994), codified at US
Code 10 (2009), §§ 12003 and 12005. Note: two
percent of 24,500 is 490.
b National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1995, Public Law 103-337, § 1662,
US Statutes at Large 108 (1994), codified at US
Code 10 (2009), § 12006.
c Secretary of theNavyActionMemo,Request
for Waiver to Reserve Active Status List (RASL ) Col-
onel End Strength, February 6, 2008.
dManpower&ReserveAffairs, ‘‘Precept Con-









e Manpower & Reserve Affairs, ‘‘Maradmin
516/08: FY09 Unrestricted Reserve Colonel Se-





f National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1995, Public Law 103-337, § 1611,
US Statutes at Large 108 (1994), codified at US
Code 10 (2009), § 14306.
g The Total Force consists of both the active
and Reserve components.
h National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1984, Public Law 98-94, § 925(a)(1),
US Statutes at Large 97 (1983), codified at US
Code 10 (2009), § 1465(c).
i Army and Air Force Vitalization and Re-
tirement Equalization Act of 1948, Public Law
80-810, § 302(a), US Statutes at Large 62 (1948),
codified at US Code 10 (2009), § 12731.
j National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110-181, § 647,
US Statutes at Large 122 (2008), US Code 10,
§ 12301(d).
k National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1995, Public Law 103-337, § 1641,
US Statutes at Large 108 (1994), codified at US
Code 10 (2009), § 1370(d)(3)(A).
l Army and Air Force Vitalization and Re-
tirement Equalization Act of 1948, Public Law
80-810, § 303, US Statutes at Large 62 (1948),
codified at US Code 10 (2009), §§ 12733 and
12739(a).
m The Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW)
is a restricted system of theManpower Informa-
tion Technology Branch of Manpower & Re-
serve Affairs (M&RA). It is the Marine Corps’
official system of record for USC Title 10 end
strength reporting. The TFDW houses more
than 30 years of historical manpower data from
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a variety of USMC and DoD systems including
MCTFS,MASS, RCCPDS,MCTIMS andDEERS,
in one central location to provide manpower an-
alysts with a comprehensive view of a Marine’s
career from ‘‘street to fleet.’’
n National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004, Public Law 108-136, § 602(c),
US Statutes at Large 117 (2003), codified at US
Code 37 (2009), § 1009(c)(1).
o Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1963,
Public Law 88-132, § 5(g), US Statutes at Large
77 (1963), codified at US Code 10 (2009), §
1401a(b)(2). Annual increases are based on in-
creases in the Consumer Price Index above the
base index.
pOffice of Management and Budget, ‘‘Circu-
larNo. A-94 Revised,’’ http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/rewrite/circulars/a094/a094.html.
(accessed 1 November 2009).
q United States Department of Labor, ‘‘ECI
Current Dollar Historical Listings,’’ under Bureau
of Labor and Statistics: ECT Tables, http://www.
bls.gov/web/echistrynaics.pdf. Using March
2001–2008 statistics, the base quarter 8-year ECI
is 3.37%.
r Social Security Online, ‘‘Cost-of-Living Ad-
justments,’’ under Automatic Increases, http://
www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/colaseries.html.
Using 2002–2009 COLA rates, the average in-
crease is 3.1%.
s The AR colonel grade strength limitation
of 32 (see 10 US Code § 12011 using an end
strength of 2,261) is inclusive of the 490 RASL
colonel grade strength. However, these two sep-
arate competitive categories are managed and
promoted independently.
t In practice, these months vary slightly.
However, clearing the previous year promotion
boardduring theMay–June timeframe allows for
the greatest flexibility for fixing grade strength
overages in execution prior to the September 30
mandate.
uNote: the fiscal year 2011 promotion board
precept was approved by the Secretary of the
Navy prior to completing this analysis. As such,
the first year of the five-year promotion plan
cannot be changed and is not used to determine
consistency of zones and opportunities.
v Secretary of the Navy Instruction
(SecNavInstr) 1420.1B, para 12(a), guidance for
promotion opportunity is 50% ± 10%.
w Promotion zones were artificially con-
strained based on model and processing power
limitations. This constraint was relaxed slightly
where appropriate for sensitivity analysis.
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